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idddl To assist you in deciding where the best value in Clothing is obtainable, Blackler's have compiled the following list, taken at random from their extensive new stock, which we ask you to carefully study, then come along and examine for yourselves the really remarkable Bargains and at such keen prices, in BLACKLER'S CLOTHING DEPARTMENT. WT A% I. MEN'S SECTION FIRST FLOOR. Lur I shoulders, step collars, thoroughly proofed, I b LOT Fashionable COVERT COATS, impawn j -rcrl' f'S Rainproof Gabardine COATS, Raglan A I- I shoulders, step collars, thoroughly proofed, I b Fashionable COVERT COATS, impawn j STANDARD SUITS & OVERCOATS. /» j Large consignment just arrived. No more Im A So only! Men's Tweed OVERCOATS, I Raglan, patch pockets, half lin«d shot silk. £ j a j kfi Naval Trench OVERCOATS, indigo blue, j LOr Naval Trench OVERCOATS, indigo blue, j As LOT 6 Medium Grey Herringbone Tweed OVER- llffifL jls COATS, half belt >and inverted pleat at back, smartly shaped, and velvet collar. J Jmd- TPVT I A YOUTHS' I A jECTION I If*1 J i la OVERCOATS, dark grey, belted back, || i I B strapped cuffs. Ages 9 to 14. On size 7. j JJffl| LOT fagf 111 liPlllW1 Q Navy Trench RAINCOATS, lined check, A I SI mill1 19 J8 IPiJ convertible collars, warm and rainproof, fc|jji^J j LOT H lH Ijml 1*™" RAINCOATS, button to neck, lined f|t fjjjf nlm .10 :$11 throughout, several shades of dark and J/ gg \|Jf II li'Mff IffM Hi raja lllf LOT medium fawns. On size 6. j toS JjKM 1 jjlff Dark Fawn Trench RAINCOATS. |ljj| ^°rna^ei'e" ™3ke. For youths aged 9 to J j m LOT flff <m <« OKA ONLY. Heavy Paramatta I 1 I MACKINTOSHES. Same V|| weight as men's. Guaranteed waterproof. ^^19 ™ All sizes. I §Boys & Juveniles Smart Navy or Brown Nap Cloth fk f 1 F OVERCOATS, s;zes 3 to 7, double- yJ, nrf breasted and belted. On size 3. j | OX) to size 6. Rainproof COVERT lit I ■ OVERCOATS, in three shades, fully 11 lined. A really smart coat. On size 4. I A Sizes 5, 6 and 7 only. Boys' Donegal O *1 Tweed SPOKTS SUlTS, plain knickers, J Q P3 Black Rubber COATS, with or without /ll SBr/Em I belts, absolutely waterproof. Just the 1 11 Hw JKri V A v thing for school. On size 30 inch. Mvl R|d In 1 Navy Blue OVERCOATS, button to A Imm To clear at P3 Black Rubber COATS, with or without /ll SBr/Em I belts, absolutely waterproof. Just the 1 11 Hw JKri V A v thing for school. On size 30 inch. Mvl R|d In 1 Navy Blue OVERCOATS, button to A Imm I 8^ neck or open fronts, brass buttons, belted at J/II JLfmSi^PHjiaHP X V' back. Splendid quality, bize o. A^ Tor ——~ nAn Assorted Lot of Little Boys' OVER- I CO A TS, of good quality, buttoned to neck, 1 £ I f: warm and comfy, on size 000. Price a J IB A The above Genuine Bargain Numbers I POST have just arrived, and Blackler's ALL ORDERS advise you to shop at once. Samples ORDERS receive f j« 1 i • .1 f°r Careful °' eac" garment are displayed m the 2Q and windows. A cheaper or more com- are sent j prompt prehensive Stock has never been carriage Attention, offered for years. Secure your wants Paid. f while the Stock lasts. I J BLACKLER'S STORES I Elliot St. and Gt. Charlotte St., LIVERPOOL. CLOSED ONE P.M. WEDNESDAYS.

HOUSING SCHEME RUMOURS. MILLIONSFROM AJlERlCA. cSk LS r,"™ no Government.machinery available to^cirry out the count.y h housing projects ir#* hi?! heard rumours that Am^ica,, well*„hers K offered to lend Mr L|«yd Geor-c £ 22 000 to go on with his housing scheme ^'uuo'uuu The Chairman (Mr G. Kovvley) said ,hat iIQ understood that a syndicate had offered Mr ivloyd George £ 100,000,000 for houshm and that he was considering the offer

Three new mines are being^^iT- end, Glamorganshire, 15 000 000^ »/V 5 coal output.

IHE NATIONALISATION OF MINES. (I.) Once more England is threatened with civil war, and this time in connection with the proposed nationaLi.-satiori" of mines. it appears to be the more prudent course to treat this threat seriously, though of eg-urse without exaggeration. It is quite true that there is no large body of men in the kingdom which desires civil war, and the lightning strike of railwayman, in spite of Mr J. H. Thomas' strong lan- guage. never brought us within view of any s-uoh disaster. But unhealed differ- enoes muat in the long run lead to an ex- plosion; and there can be no doubt that the miners have set their hearts on this particular change, and that they have the general pport of the whole body of organised Labour; whilst on the other hand tlw Government has met the demand with a Hat refusal. Till now labour de- mands have been met by large concessions, in wages a.nd hours; and even this process cannot in the long run avoid civil con- flict, because it leads directly to national bankruptcy. In this case the demand, on the surface of it, does not touch the ques- tion of monev. Yet Nationalisation, bluntly stated, means two things; first that the mines are to De taken away from their present owne.rs; secondly, that the miners arc to bo able to dip to any extent into the public purse, and in exchange to supply an amount of coal fa.r below the public necessities. Such claims 'no sane Government can concede. It may be that thero are other forms of nationalisa- tion which can be granted wit.hout in- volving general ruin; it will be one of the aims of these articles to coIIslder and de- fine any such pro{xjNal>. But so far the miners have shown no disposition to accept nationalisation except on their own terms. If a collision is to come. it is well for both parties to consider beforehand not only the justice of their cause, but also the forces which they can bring illto action. There can be no real negotiation betwoen parties when one of the two is oonscious of its own weakness, and has made up its wind, ill the la,st resort, to surrender. There is no doubt that this is the attitude of a large part of the public, and possibly it is also the attitude of the Government; the brave words of the Prime Minister cannot altogether convince those who have observed how often they have been fol- lowed in the past. and notably in dealings with the miners, by a complete abdication of his position, For those who contem- plate such a. surrender these articles are not written; they assume that resistance may be a duty, and that in any case it is a possibility. The two parties that may come into con- flict cannot accurately be described as Capital and Labour, or as Governmejit and Revolution. The amount of capital invested in the mines is relatively small, and its treatment is the least of the practical difficulties; and only organised Labour stands on the side of the miners. Of those who labour "with hand or head" a great proportion support the Govern- ment, as was shown by the General Elec- tion- Pemaps the opponents can most fairly bf described as the Democratic" and "Soviet" parties. The Government relies on the Parliamentary vote of the majority of ejectors: all those who con- front it are agreed in setting up as a superior power an elaborate hierarchy of committees, reaching its apex somewhere in the atmosphere of the Trades Union Congress. From this hierarchy all but manual labourers are carefully excluded; even the few "intellectuals" of the middle olasses who have allied themselves to organised Labour are held in strict sub- jection, and allowed no real voice in the determination of policy. Further tho organisation consistently expresses its ad miration, and tenders its support, to the Russian Bolshevists. Without using any hard words, it must be said frankly that the whole movement tends to establish Soviet Government in the United King- dom. "A REAL AND DANGEROUS REVOLUTIONARY ELEME NT. Within the movement there are many shades of temperament and opinion. It is never right to underrate the attraction of Revolution in itself. The pulling down of established Government, the humbling and even the extermination of the "rich," the glare of burning factories and the tang of bullets exercise m all oountries a fascina- tion on discontented and unsettled minds. There is a real and dangerous revolution- ary element in the United Kingdom, and if civil wa.r comes, this element will be oh the miners' side. There are also the Syndicalists. Their programme is simpte it is to wrest each industry in turn from its present capitalist" owners, to hand it over to committees of the workers in it. and then to exploit the national needs by providing the smallest possible production at the highest possible price. Syndicalism is an imitation of cornering" as practiseod by unprincipled financiers, and it makes its appeal direotly to the love of money. It has been preached amongst the miners for the last twenty years, and has a strong hold upon them. The Syndicalists will be ardent supporters of the miners' cause, which tits in well with their ultimate aims. The bu!k of organised Labour is neither Revolutionary nor Syndicalist, but Marxist; that is it consists of mon who have more or less persuaded themselves that Capital rightly belongs to the work- ers in each industry, that all the fruits of production belong to these workers, and that the industries can be taken OVN and run by their eommittees for the good of the nation at large. From this point ot view all civic activities which are not on Trades Union lines are superfluous and parasitic. Government itself is unneces- sary. because all questions of price (no other question is taken into account) can be settled by reasonable discussion between the parties. The Marxists are theorists, and if their theory is right, nationalisa- tion on the miners' lines should be con- ceded at once. One or of men are convinced that it is right, and are not open to discussion on the point: they will, therefore, support the miners without hesitation. Lastly, there are iu the ranks of organ- ised Labour great numbers of men who belong to none of these groups, but are allied bY their convictions to the Demo- cracy. Nevertheless they are held to the Soviet organisation by its mechanical per- fection. They have not the nerve to face either the arguments that are constantly dinned into their ears, or the physical force with which they know that any active opposition will be met. Their present stronghold is in the ballot; and the ballot is the last "refuge of those who are about to be defeated. It is plain then that the Soviet party disposes of a formidable force and a highly- developed organisation, it also possesses efficient leaders. For every step taken by Government the ruen of the Soviet have long ago prepared a countermove: their own "strategic policy" remains con- cealed by the fact that, though it is openly proclaimed, no one on the Government side pays any attention to it. In every respect the Soviet position corresjxwids closely to tha.t of the Central Powers at the outbreak of the war, and its adherents are equally confident of an early and com- plete victory. Nevertheless that victory h far from assured: there are forces in beng, and others in course of development, which may thwart it. First amongst these is the group of so-called extremists or young bloods" on the Government side men who see with clear vision that the Soviet movement means not only their own ruin but the downfall of the hole tra- dition of English rationality. There i- also the Government not the War Cabi- net (which can not be counted on), but, h" rank and tile of Government officials who bave conducted the war and are now build- ing up an organisation for the mainten- ance of civic ordcr- There are hundreds of thousands of ex-soldiers and ex-sailors, who without being very clear as to the Soviet theory, yet feel acutely that com- fortable and weil-naid jobs are being monopolised hy men who did not take their fair share in the trials of the war. Besides these there is a large number of indopende it workers, who having always been solf-rcliant, come promptly to the assistance of Government when the at-- tempt is made to hold up the nation to ransom. Further, there is a QmaH but growing body of theorists on the side of thø democracy, that is. of men who both by the study of history and economies, and hy the more direct observation of *ho Bolshevik experiment, are convinced that the Soviet party should be resisted to the bitter end. The railway strike did a grext service to the community by showing ho'v much could be accomplished at a few hours' notice by a combination of these groups. The whole force thus gathered iogcther has shown itself sufficiently strong to cope with one nf the most jiowerful Trade Ln ions, but it is still far from being a inatcn for that combination of a!l the Soviet forces which is Iowty. hut with determina- tion, concentrating against it. It is therefore necessary to take into accouat the still larger numbers of those who have not yet. declared themselves on i ither :,e. The oil |x>litical parties. Conservative, Liberal, and Socialist, are ail decadent bodies, certain to maintain neutrality in the effort to prolong their u-eless lives. The poliœ and the army have their part to p'ay. hut it will be concerned with non- essentials: a civic strife can ony be deter- mined by civic organisations based on voluntary service. The action of the Par- liamentary Labour Party is more difficult to forecast. By the very law of its being it is called upon "to defend Parliamentary institutions, and in such leaders as Mr Henderson and rr Gosling it posses; ieal personalities ambitious of laying th!Ù in a Labour Government, and sincere- ly averse to civil war. In this gf0Up ar, found the "mediators" \\ho effected the settlement of the rai'way strike and wh) are even now planning a similar settlement of the problem of nat oofilisatio:: Rue it must not ba forgotten that these men arj quite unablo to control the organisations to which they owe their rnwer. and it civic peace is not preserved, the Parlia- mentary Labour Party also will split into two parts and count for nothing. A LATENT FORCE. There still remains the latent force of those men anu women, probably an abo- lute majority of the inhabitants of the Bri- tish Isles, who have as yet joined neithei side, who are incredulous of coming dan. ger, and who pin their faith to unhmite i largess from the "bottomless purse" of the nation as a remedy for the disturbance which they politely call "industrial un- rest." Just the same men and women in the spring of 1914 disbelieved the possi. bil'ty of a European war. Now the Soviet ieaders reckon on ,them as supporters, he cause by their constant clamour for "gen- erosity" they help to exhaust the public purse and fill the coffers of the opposition. But the experience of 014 suggests that when the time comes they may take tè., other side: and little as they are given to abstract thinking, the fear of national bankruptcy is steadily gaining a gnp on their minds. If a crisis arise. this part of the community will again display its stubborn good qualities, and neither outcrv nor suffering will shift it from its posi- tion. The ooviet party may possibly find that it will not even be willing to listen to the seductivp pea of a negotiated peac." Civil war is a grave evil, but it is not so grave as political or economic deca;, and under certain circumstances it may be a necessary condition of revived civic life Opinions must differ as to the circum- stances which may make it necessary hilt it is not wise to shut our eyes to its sibility, or to cover up the ugy prospect by unreal phrases. a phrase now cur- rent is "economic pressure." Economic pressure, as interpreted bv the Sovi. party, means a design to crush the re- sistance of opponents by cold and hunger, and to weaken the State by demoralising its finance. These steps are in themselves produce conditions in which con- flicts of violence will be un- avoidable. Even those who think the danger is exaggerated cannot deny that it is prudent to provide against it In what then consists the prevision which shoald now be made? In two things, prepaiation for peace and preparation for defence. In the next article preparation for jieace will be discussed: its main purport must be con- sideration of the fundamental issues of the industrial conflict, with the intention of offering to organised Labour the utmost, concessions consistent with the national welfare. Such a progicir.me cannot be re- conciled with the policy of opportunism which all GO\ l'l nments are tempted to pursue: it means holding firmly to prin- ciples a.nd disregarding details: it means the presentation of the nation's cause a whole to public view, and the enunciation n: a policy which will the largest pos- sible forces for defence, whilst abstain- ing from all provocation to possible ag- gressors. It will offer pcace. a.nd count on peace. Rut it will not b1ind it.se'f to the possibility that peace may be refu.^ed. and 1f1 that case it. will give way to prepara- tion for defence. In the third !>rtio'e th. attempt will be made to show in a genera! way how that defence may be effective. (II.) The avowod programme of nationalisa- tion is that the mines should be worked by the nation and tor the nation: the underlying assumption is that at present they an being v. orked for the ben "lit of a small class. Yet tor every ton of coal sold at tho pithead at about 50s there is paid 21s for labour "by hand or head," Va tor stores, and only Zs lor rent, royal- ties, and interest on capital. Of the pro- duct about 67 per cent, is employed m the vital industries of the nation, and 33 per cent, in domestic consumption and under the present rationing system the excess consumption of the richer olasses can hartt- ly amount to 5 per cent. of the whole. it does not, tiheiefore, appear that the nation has much to pain by a revolution in the industry. The true intent of the proposed new form of management is best shown dv the history of the Coal Commission. A demo- cratic Government proposed a Commission representative of ail interests, to be pre- sided over by a judge, and to ascertain and lhsCWiS impartially the facts. The Miners' Federation demanded (under threat of a strike) that one-hait of the eOUJmissloners should be men pledged to rhelr own views. Enquiry and discussion thus became superlluous; it only remained to secure the vote of the chairman. Under the strike threat Air Justice bankey gave his approval to the principle ot nationali- sation; but in his tinal report he only granted Lhe miners' demands subject to other conditions in the interests of the nation; and in particular he insisted that the annual output should not be less than 250,000,000, and that the right to stride should end. The miners accepted that part of his report which emoodied their own views, rejected the remainder, dubtKxl the report thus mutilated the "majority report," and insisted that the Government should give it elleot. Two things are clear; first, that there can bo no reaJ negotiation when one ot the parties :s subjected to a permanent threat; secondly, that in practice nationali- sation is merey a aisguisc tor syndicau- sation. Should the wnole mining industry bo placed (as the miners propose) under the control of a system ot joint com- mittees in each ot which the miners con- stitute one-halt at the members, and tile chairman is a political official, we work of the committees will consist solely in registering decisions previously agreed upon oy the miners' section, the character of those decisions is already ptam. No 111- terest or dividend will be allowed to tne "owl!crs" of mmes or maclunery; ptece- work will be abolashed; workmen wil1 obey the orders not ot managers, but of shop stewards saving wîIl be treated as a cnme, In fact, the four commandments of the English Soviets will be established: do not pay, do not exert yourself, do not obey, do not save. The results cannot be different ta. what they have been under every communistic regime. Work falls ofi m quantity and quality; machmry goes out of repair and is not replaced; con- fusion reigns and production sinks. The whole nation sinks into poverty. It does not alter these facts that only some of the Soviet men are at heart de- structive, and that the icst are idealists. In the Golden Age, in Paradise, in the Millennium, men have no debts to pay, no but works ot love, no obedience but that of loyal hearts. They need no jnfentives and no discipline. it is file root error ül lOlllmurnSIII that It endeav- ours to carry on the affairs of this work- a-day world on the assumption tliai in- dividual men are already perfcd But tho Russian Soviets appear already to have outgrown this assumption, and the English movement may yet do the same. The problem 01 the nationaiTsalon ot mines cannot be dealt with by itscit and it cannot be dealt with by compromise. It is only part of demand for- the nationali- sation of every industrial activity, the sup- pression of all private enterprise, and tne establishment of a communistic nation. The statesman who can deal with tile oroblcm success!ully must have oear con- victions as vo the essential principles of ordered industrial life as they have been established y the experience ot the wnofe civilised world, and must not abandon one jot of them out ot any tear ot conse- quences On the other hand, he must be prepared to jettison without hesitation all that is obsolete or superfluous in tne present social system, rnd must ma.ke no attempt to rebuild what has rotted away. To for- mulate Ins programme is a task which requires all the constructive abiTrty of the nation but it is perhaps not hard to lay down certam principles n which the great majority of moderate men would ;;t once concur, as for instance: (i.) There must be liquidation of tho National Debt, balancing of tho National income with the expenditure, stabilisation of the currency, and standardisation ot wages. The National Debt is a mortgage on the title deeds ot individual citizens, and the sooner this mortgage is cancelled by a scientific capital levy or by an assesesd loan at low interest, the better for all parties. The balancing ul H e National Budget requires the enomg subsidies, whether tor bread, tuol. port, or housing, except .n the inter.-m., u, those who are icaily poor. Stabilisation of the currency means that the power 01 issuing currency notes should be taken out of the hands of Government, and placed in the hands ot trustees for national in- dustry. Standarisabion of wages means that all wages paid by Government should be determined by general principles, and that they should rise with the increase of production and tor no other reason. (n ) The working capital of ail indus- tries must be increased, machinery im- proved, motive power multiplied. Capital, therefore, must receive its rewar(1. and It it is to be dissociated from class divisions, must be contributed by workmen under cooperatIve conditions. 1,111.) There must be direct incentives both to good work and to thrift, a.nd some part of wages must therefore be reserved for individuals end concerns which pro- duce a protit. (iv.) Everywhere there must be discip- line and theretore authority. Individual workmen iiiust comply with the directions of captains who are set over them; but these captains, managers, and foremen must be ultimately responsible to some authority constituted all a democratic basis. It any existing political party were based on principle instead ot on opportunism, it would certainly include the above features in its programme. To the Parliamentary Labour Party must be paid the tribute that it has endeavoured to formulate its principles; but in omitting from its pro- gramme the essential questions ot stability, industry, thrift, and discipline it has shown how much it has yet to learn. From tha principles thus indicated it is not hard to deduce a practical plan for the nationalisation of minos. The plan now to be proposed agrees in its mam outlines with the Duckham report, but goes beyond it in aiming directly at placing the mining industry on a co-operative basis as ngard. capital To give dehniie- ness, rough figures are inserted tnrough- out but actual figures could only be pro- posed as a result or expert investigation. SCHEME FOR THE CO-OPERATIV WORKING OF BRITISH MINES. (i.) The capital ot the mining industry will amount (say) to viz, ai compensation tor existing interests, of which one-half will be mort- gaged in the interests of the National Debt under the general liquidation anu will be represented by Debentures; to;1 improved machinery; £ 260,000,<XX) for housing. The two last sums will be provided by working men, say £250,000,000 by miners ana ijJs60,dOO,(X}O by men in other trades. There- fore each miner on an average would i.eiu to subscribe £2W. This amount could most easily be raised by a miners tax ot £1 a week on unmarried miners, continued for 10 years (age 16 to iT the system were in full operation each miner at trio end of 26 years' work would possess a capital of over steadily increasing till he desired to retire. The maximum holding would be t'1000. (ii.) The various control committees be elected partly by the miners as worker. partly by the shareholders, pa\-t:y by file representatives of j.ub'ic interests. It wTii not be essentiaf to retain the system of piece-work, but some substantial rewaru must be reserved (a) lor individual workers whose output is good, (b) tor all miners in pits or districts tor which the output is abcve the average. (lii.) The rnnual output, which has re- cently fallen from 2(5,000,000 tons to with improved machinery and goodwill be easily raised to 400,000,000 tons. The profit will go partly to reduc- tion of price and partly to increase of wages; that is, the principle will be "tne lower the price, the higher the wages." It can hardly be questioned that any such p'an would he highly to liic ad van tago both of the miners and ot the nation Is it, however, a pian which eitner a j'ar- liamentary Government or a body of trades union "mediators" is likely to produce and insist upon? The obstacles are obvious. The Covern- ment has already accepted the Duckham report, a scheme simpler and more imme- diately practicable man that here out- lined, and has received no support for ic from either side. ne iir.ne-owners have some reason to dislike it, i'or it still further lowers profits which are already less than those which obtain in other busi- nešse<; and ihe mmer wl1 not hear of It, for it has beBII dinned mto his ears that capitalists are not entitled to any return for their investments, though apparently they may still be allowed 10 supply all needful machinery and make up annual deficits. As to management, the two sides are still further from agreement; tor though Mr J. H. Thomas may talk smooth- ly of men desiring to contribute ideas and share control, he knows well enough that the unions are pledged to reiuse all agree- ments with capital, and that they demand unconditional supremacy. Owners, there- fore, are not so very unreasonable if they decline to parley with opponents who pro- claim in advance that they will not listen to reason. The Soviet party may and does argue that however much Government may blus- ter, it IS sure m the 0lH1 Lo climb dOllH; but their opPQnents may with equal truth contend that \I henever Uovernmellt knows itis own mind, Labour gives up the fight. Trades unionists claim that they han. won the railway strike, and got the owners of projierty "an the run", but the Demo- cracy too has tasted blood, and believes that there exist enough independent spirits in Great Britain to run every trade witn out the help of organized labour. Tnc majority of the people believe and pray that somehow a settlement will be reached, but they do not help to suggest its terms. At. present the clash is complete; the miners insist on nationalisation on their own terms, nd Parfiament declares that it will never accept those terms. Even the most pacific onlooker cannot deny that it may be patriotic to retuso conditions which are obviously irreconcileable withThe per- manent proilperity oi the nation, and better to fight now than to surrender not only the elementary pifnciples ot economics, but also the resources whicli at present give some prospect of success. WiTen passions are so heated and the confidence of victory is so strong on both sides, file mediator's task is seldom hopeful; and in this case the mediator himself has yet to be found. There may be bluff on either side, but bluff is the last stage before war breaks out. When we consider the forces that even at this moment are being mas8ed upon both sides, and the ambiguous verdict of public opinion as declared, at the poll- ing booths, it can hardly be denied that the conditions eXist which have !cd in past times to civil war. In the concluding article an attempt wlll be made to fore- cast in a general way what such a con- flict will mean tor both parties, and how best tho Democracy may hope to win its way through victory to industrial peace. (III.) W1 len the nationalisation of mines is I next brought forward it will not stand alone, but will be part of a- general pro- gramme pressed forward by the united forces of organised labour. That pro- gramme will he studiously moderate in its formal hernia, and will ask (i.) that all essential industries be in future conducted in the national interest, lii.) that the con- ditions of labour be determined by joint committees of which the workers in each industry shall appoint one ihalf, a.nd (iii.) tnat the profits of each industry be paid into the National Exchequer. In the un- official version which will be circulated amongst the members of the Trades Unions these proposals will be explained more de- finitely as meaning (i.) that all property other than that of the members of Trades Unions shall be confiscated, (ii.) that Trades Unionists shall fix their own wages and hours of work, and (iii.) that the annual deficits in each trade shall be paid by the Government in preference to tho interest on the National Debt. It i3, of course clear to all thinking persons that these demands include the whole Revolutionary and Soviet programme. The demands will be presented to the Cabinet in due form, and rofueed en bloc. There will then be a conference betweon the leaders oh the two aidos, wbich at the Wt moment will result in an agreement that (i.) the demands of the Trades Unions are unpre- cedented and unjustifiable, (ii.) feW in view o the unusual circumstances they Ua 'j that agreement be embodied in an Act of Parliament to be pa^ed within six weeks. "Public opin- ion" will applaud this compromise as a triumph of commonsense. It is, however, hard to believe tihat any British Parliament will pass such an Act, of which the repudiation of the National Debt and the destruction of British indus- try would appear on the slightest reflation to bo inevitable consequences. Thus on mo appointed day "direct action" would •^nsue, and the Soviet party would be able to say, not without-truth, that all agree- ment had been broken. The Cabinet would resign, and a "business Cabinet" be appointed for the sole purpose of conduct- ing a general election. But it is impro- bable that either side would await the verdict of the polls, or that such a verdict would produce a solution. The civil war would have begun. At that moment all the frivolous ques- tions which were raised at the beginning of the world war will be raised again. Will war be formally declared? How long will it last? What are we fighting about? Would not peace be cheaper at any price ? Will there be bloodshed? To such ques- tions no answer can be given; when war has begun tele only real question for the indi- vidual is "On which side do I stand?" and for the leader- "What is my policy?" To those who are undecided on the first point it may be useful to note that the Red Terror is part of the official pro- gramme of the British Soviet party, that its leader has already demanded the pow- er to hang British citizens witnout the in- 10 tervention of judge or jury, and that all the idealist schemes for reconstructing British society assume that the middle classes and independent workers will have pa-sed out of existence. The majority of the party are, of course, not prepared to" go so far, but it would be rash to assumo tnat the theory will never be realised in fact. Prophecy as to the events and result of war is equally futile. The decisive factors, she personality of the leaders, and the enthusiasm and endurance of those who follow are unknown quantities. But we do know that a good cause counts for much, and tnat a good cause should dis- play itself from the first in policy and long experience has shown that certain definite results always follow- from par- ticular social causes. A forecast of a civil war can only mean the tracing in ad- vance of the necessary working of social laws: that will be only a part. of the real war, but as it is the only part that can be known in advance, it fully deserves study. In the following sketch it is attempted to outline WHAT WOULD HAPPEN if each side acted with s-trict reasoning troni its avowed principles. On the outbreak of war the general strike would be proclaimed on the Red side, and would be met by the Whites by a call for the formation of a Citizen Guard, The Reds would then organise a Red Guard, and for some days the two bodies would pass in procession up and down the streets of our large towns, without coming to blows. Occasional outbreaks of vio- lence would be suppressed by the police, with the aid of tie leaders on both sides. After three or four days the preponderance of strength in each locality would becomo evident. In London and half-a-dozcn large towns and in the country districts the Wnites would be the stronger; most of the industrial towns would be in the power of the lteds. In these latter the various municipal authorities would be called upon to surrender to Soviet Com- missaries, and very possibly they would do so without resistance. Perhaps within a week a broad belt of country, including the Eastern half of Wales, and extending across the industrial Midlands, Lancashire, Yorkshire, Durham and Northumberland, would be fully organised as a Britis'i Soviet Republic. Tne North and East of Scotland, and the whole South and Soutih- We.-t of England would certainly adhere to tho present constitution. But the issues would remain essentially economic, and it would be folly to attempt to decide them except by economic means. Each party would need to organise, disci- pline, and feed its adherents: the Reds would soon run short of food, the Whites of coal. The general strike would there- fore be abandoned; the Reds would at- tempt to run their industries by Soviet methods, the Wnites would easily replace strikers in their area by volunteer labour and the employment of ex-soldiers. Ne- cessity will bring about temporary ac. commodations, and Red coal will be ex- changed at neutral stations for White but- ter and beef. The longer such a strugglo is protracted the better it will be; for only time and experience can root out false ideas. Each side would learn muqh by a serious attempt to maintain exist- cittle-at the best it would be an impover- ished and painful existence—by its own forces only. But we must pass over the sufferings to consider how the main princi- ples of the opposing parties would work out on the critical questions of the cur- rency, conditions of Labour, personal in. centive, and thrift. The Reds would at once call in the ex- isting currency, and replace it by notes on the Bank of National Industry. The cur- rency should, according to theory. have for its unit tne Hour: that is, the value of one man's work for one hour. But in no trade would a man be, in fact, content to receive ono Hour (currency) in exchange for one hour's work, even if that Hour had a nominal exchange value of live shil- lings. The Soviet Government would have a great deal to do to settle wage claims, to adjust-tne balance between the supposed value of the finished article of one trade when it becomes the raw material of an- other, to pay its soldiers and police, and to import (if it could) food and cotton from abroad. The notes will be issued in enor- mous numbers, their value will become de- preciated, confidence in them will disap- pear. The Soviet Government can ony c;ieck this process by asserting the princi- ple of the maximum wage. The conditions of work will at first he regulated by the Shop Committees. Ca'- canny will be officially discouraged, but the habits of years will not be so easily eradicated. Output will fall off, stores will be depleted. The Government will be forced in time to reward good work by some form of extra wages, and the princi- ple of piece work will again be introduced, and expert management made the rule. Money will be needed to buy stores and machinery, and taxation will not be popu- lar. Citizens will first be asked to sub- scribe to voluntary loans, but te payment of interest will be found more effective, and co-operative capital .will at last be called into existence. Government by committees will be sub- jected to constant criticism, for which an outlet will be needed. There will be no other than the formation of some kind of Representative Government. In short, in all essentials the principles of tiie Estab- lished Order will be revived. If t;lls is already the case in Bolshevist Russia, as is testified bv all recent observers, how much more quickly will it come about in Britain after centuries of experience in constitu- tional rule? THE OTHER SIDE. Let us turn to the other side. Tne Whites, too, will need to reform their in- flated currency, and what elve t-an they do but return to a metallic basis? The new five-pound piece will perhaps be little larger than tne British sovereign whioll has disappeared, and the new five-shilling piece will be very like tie present shilling. But their real value will depend on the effective labour for wnich they are exchanged. The White Government will put an end to maximum prices and mini- mum wages, and thus encourage each in- dividaut to rely on his own exertion and skill. Tliii wll come hard on tne aged and the feckless, but they will receive help on the true ground, namely, their poverty, and not in return tor the imagined value of their cervices. Labour will be relatively short on the White side, and it will become a point of honour on the part of the educated citi- zens to share its i-oughiicss and its periie with their comrades. Thioti will raMc the social standard of labour, and pave the way to a co-operative organisation of industry. Expert management will from the first be unreservedly accepted. But the Whites will start without receiving any substan- tial support from any House of Commons, and though they will respect that ancient institution, they will soon construct by its sid-e a second House to which access will be open by deeds rather than by words. It is to be anticipated that agriculture will suffer but little loss by the civil con- flict, and the industries of London and the home provinces will not long be inter- rupted. Transport is already provided for. If the Whites really show themselves the stronger organisation, their first advance will bo the opening of a port and of a c-oa! mine. All th duties of ;;vch industry will be rehearsed in advance in well-or- o-anised schools of instruction, and every co-operator will start for his work with his tools over one shoulder and his rifle over the other. It will not be long before open- ings show themselves in more than one locality. The Whites will for years bo badly C' oloifchod and ill-warmed, buit they will be well £00 and well housed. New industrial towns will spring up everywhere, for re- turned soldiers will find no work easier or

more attractive than the building of them. Unless all experience of communistic soci- eties is reversed, the Whites will, after a few years of suffering, be a more united, more prosperous, and, above all, a more contented society than their opponents. Inherited wealth will have been well spent in laying the foundations of a new world, and cla^s distinctions will havo disappeared jn the presence of a oommoti experience, Then we may expect that hero and there Red districts will begin to secede, and the map of England once more to change. At the same time the working principles of the two sides will have approximated 60 closely each to the other that they will wonder why they over were at variance. The day for the "mediators" will at last have arrived. But if it is really true that the Soviet men have found eouflder princi- ples of social organisation, the secessions will be from the other side. We have pictured a war without fight- ing, without famine, and ultimately with- out ill-will. The actual war will hardly bo so happy as this. But what-ever its terrors may be they will in the long run bring no gain to the P<i.lcS v/nfdi is responsible for them, and once more the doctrine of f rigilt- fulness will be discredited. Yet, even history knows of bloodless wars, and the Romans are said to have conducted such a war for ten years without the loss of a single life. This should be our aim, too. The cost wiU be heavy enough, but no one dare say that it will be so heavy as the cost of that spiritless surrender to the mixed company of dreamers and crimina which so many of us are at this room en contemplating with superficial calmness.