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Mr. Lloyd George ha,3 added wsightily to the debt that the Allied cause, and humanity itself, owes to h:.m by t.he ruthless candour and courage of his speech at Paris. We re- joice in it, not only tot the most important reform which it announced in the Allied tr othod of conducting the war, but in the proof it affords that our leader is rich in the talents which his position, as the most prominent of all the Allied statesmen, and the Premier of the country on whom, for the moment, falls the brunt of the fray, demands imperatively. It was a. speech which de- monstrated again the vigour and keenness of insight, the fierce and unrelaxing energy vith which he pvepscs his point, and the clear sighted recognition of the truth, how- ever bf?erlv unu?tabLs, which will an make for victory. It was a new title to t?he eu-ioses which M. Painleve, a. type cf the scientific Frenchman: bestowed on our leader as the man who "5tcod for patriotism, gener- ositv and democracy, one of the most reso- lute organisers of an implacable war to a finish, who had by his inexhaustible energy, his eloquence, his imagination, unceasingly stimulated .tbe. magnificent effort of Great Britain and her Domin ions." The situation at the close of more than three years of war was frankly faced. Ail countries, with the signal exception of America, are much nearer, some border upon, the fatal stage of complete exhaus- tion. All are sorelv drained of their men and their treasure, 'some have fallen worn- out from the fray, ethers are barely able to battle 011. The Allies have, upon the whole, always possessed, at least potentially, and now possess unmistakably what Mr. L George termed all the essential ii^re ten s of victory the advantage in numbers,, in weight of men and material, in economic and financial resources, and beyond and! above all in the justice of their cause. Ana by the wav in war, as in a duel, there is in- finite truth in Mr. Anthony Hope's witty comment that one is advantaged by a clear, conscience in a trial of armed strength,, which is no use at all. in a court of law. ] Yet after three years in which men have died by the million, and gtfld has flowed by the thousand of million pounds, we are still J far from victory. "Who and what is responsible?" With inferior resources, palpably employed with superior skill, the enemy holds in territory and militarily a marked advantage. We are compelled to the confession that we dare not go to-day to a council table and disouss' peace with the situation as it stands. The reply given by the Premier was that "the unity of the Allies, in so far as strategy; went, a pure make-believe. There was; a collection of completely independent; schemes pieced together. The stitches came out and the disintegration was complete." And the strategy of the campaign focussed the whole Allied effort. No heroism, no nobility of moral purpose. no outlay of life: and toil, however prodigal, went for ought, or for what it should justly count, if the vital domain of strategy all went amiss. In the result we had a situation in ttaly which might develop into a coastrophe unless there was a qrick and final break with the past, and, said our leader, I have made up my mind that unless some change was eff ecteil Ican no longer remain responsible for a war direction doomed to disaster for lack of unity. The Allie'd War Council is the result. For the ^noment, but 111V temporarily, it is limidto the three Vve-tcrn Allies wno 1 have facing them the weighty problem 01 the rescue of Italy, in. which ( neither j America not*Russia, as. she gtautk, caiitake, part. Their inclusiwn will comte later.. -Next year the American representation in par- ticular will have weighty part to play. The seheme'is a delicate matter and likely to bt): intricate in its working. The bread desider- atum is the construing of the war as an affair of a single front; and the pooling of the., Allied resources. But the execution of the object- which it is so easy to state is a task to test the Allied military intellect. The Coun oil is to be advisory, but not executive. As 1 we interpret it, it' will rough out,the draft; of plans of which the details will be left to the present Allied General Staffs and leaders. Mr. Lloyd George left the impression also that the Allied failures had been due, L<}t oni, to the absence of any reaJ co-ordini- t,on but to an inferiority of general direc- tion, which did not perceive the necessity for co-ordination and which failed to makej a success in any theatre of the schemes tha,t were drawn up He hinted tolerably plainly that in the past he has been over-ruled, and that there, ha' r been bliiiide. in judgment ?hich have brought some of our troubles upon us. "He and some of his French COl-¡ le?sne? had insisted for years upon the prin- cip!e of the tmitv óf front, until he became almost weary of the attempt." A -statement had been submitted to the Rus- I sian conference in January about the perns and possibilities of the Italian front, t.han which nothing could more convincingly de- mon&tiu-te tlio opportunities which the -Allies, had lost thtough lack of e ruined thought and action. The inference is that offensive pUrts were suggested by development "u the Italian front which never got beyond the stage of paper schemes. Mr. Lloyd George pretty evidently favoured^ them, but. the Weqt,c)rlier. prevailed and Franco-British effort in 1917 was -concen- trated in Frar-ce until the-enemy snatched the initiative from us by his Isonzo victory. The solitary good fruit of that Russi-an conference was that it rendered the Allies able to assist Italy, in the event of her meet- ing with duster, in a much briefer period than would otherwise have been possible. Plans were drawn up for the transference, if the need arose, of large bodies of troops from France to Italy. They are now being executed. But the incalculable occurred, The Italiaii disasters on t.he Isonzo were greater and far speedier than had probably cver tseen anticipated. The Italians fell back, Rot by short stages, but with such a rush that satisfaction is expressed when the. rate 4> th-5 enemy'6 advance only equals in one day what it cOilts the Franco-British armies in Flanders mouthy of furious fighting to achieve. The incalculabl e happened; or it could'only have been-incalcula ble if the pos- sibility had never been taken into account of a collapse which could only be reasonably presumed on as a possibility to be reckoned .with if the moral of the troops of this army or that wa,; known to be bad. It is. only possible to establish a rough lS, only possible to estahli¡¡.h a rough contrast between the Allied and the German strategy at thi, stage of the war. We know, in the initial stage, tolerably well what the strategic outlines were on either -c;de. The German plan was to overwhelm trance by an irruption, througb Belgium and 'then turn on Russia. The Franco-Russian plan was for France to withsta-nd the German shock until the Russian masses could move, with' their anticipated irresistible weight. Both; plans were ruined. The Germans were foiled d. the Marne, after losing invaluable time in, Begiurn and being deprived of the great opportunity, which, nevertheless, was yet open to them, largely by the skill and constancy cf the French left wing, which was composed of the original British Expe- ditionarv Force. But the Franco-Russian v-inn failed signally also. The first Russian invasion of Pruss i a did serve as a timely di- j i!i,a.qii)n,of Pru??sta. did seri,e as a, timely di- but no more. Whilst the ?ulk cf the German army was pinned down in the West far longer than Mte Germans wished or the French needed for their Russian Allies to complete their mobilisation and overcome the difficulties their impcrfoct communications, the J*-»ssinns broke themselves against the Austro-Hungarian and Eastern German armies, and effected nothing decisive be- vond a few hard knocks upon Austria. Russia, in fact, in suite of all her endea- vours, suffered signal defeat, for the 'aim for which she riskd -xar-the protectivn of SerbIa-was lost when Serbia was queUed and conquered. After the spring of 1915 the strategic scheme of the war becomes complicated. In the West, the aim of the Allies in 1915, 1916, and 1917 may be said to have bean the expulsion of the German armies from the Allied soil they had seized (the theory of attrition was invented later to solsce us for the palpable failure to attain that purpose). The German strategy, with the one exception of Verdun, was to j sit tight. And the Germans succeeded, j whil&t on the defensive, and the Allies failed repeatedly, even 611 subsidiary aims, with the one exception of Verdun, where the effort of t;he Germans to deal France a crushing blow failed as signally as any fail- ure known to warfare. In the East, German strategy dominated in 1915, in the colossal offensive that nearly finished Russia and that did her military and strategic power infinite and enduring harm. In 1916 Russian strategy dominat- ed, as the result ,of Brussilofif s offensive undertaken in force' of the voluntary relin- quishment of the offensive by the Germans, who, having, as they believed, crippled Russia at the least in1915, sought to finish France in 1916. The- failure of Verdun threw the Germa.ns in 1916 upon the de- fensive in East and West until they baulked Brussiloff, just scraped through their peril- ous crisis on the Somme, and recovered brilliantly when their fortune seemed at the nadir, with the entrance of Rumania.. In 1917 we have seen the tra',g Of Rus- sia, the successful resistance of the Germans on the Hindenburg lines, and the revolu- tionising of the Italian campaign by the Isonzo debacle. We can trace in the enemy's campaigns much evidence of a clear conception which is lacking in the case of the Allies. After the trial of the two peace-conceived strate- gic plans of 1915 we have a, concentration of German strength against Russia, which put Russia out of harm's way, and then against Serbia, which wa« successful in the highest degree, and in many ways may be held to have consummated the entire German war objectives by clearing the way to the East, which the defence of Gallipoli had guarded, a little earlier. In 1916 German energies, having set matters to rights in the East, turned again to the West, and sought a knook-out blow, attempted and parried at Verdun, and countered with a thrust on the Somme which nearly pierced through. In 1917 we have the execution of the Italian coup, which was certainly a strategic coup of the highest order and represents the con- centration of what was left of German offen- sive energy into the channel where great '•esults might be expected from a successful blow. The Salonika episode, in its capacity asa sequel to the Serbian debacle as well as in its character as' the failure of the totally belated effort to rescue Serbia., sheds illu- mination upon Allied counsels, the conflict between the Eastern and the Western Schools, the act conceived too late to avail and inexplicably persisted in despite appar- ent total futility. Mr. Lloyd George laid stress upon the Serbian disaster as the most salient example of the disaster which at- tended the past Allied regime in strategy. He dwelt upon the war as a stage of the Central Powers, cut off by land and sea by invincible forces, north, east and west, but with a hopelessly weak besieging line upon the south which, once broken through, ¡ opened an avenue to fresh sources of strength in every respect-men. food. and minerals. The art of war has been defined by Wellington as the art of seeing what is happening on the other side of the hill- Serbia and Italy to-day provide flagrant in- stances of the absence of this quality on the Allies' part. There was failure to foresee and to furnish adequate aid against either scheme of the enemy, who has repeatedly I¡ seized, developed and pursued the initia- tive- If the two essentials of strategy are to ;;rasp the initiative and force the enemy to conform to it, and to foresee and provide' for the enemy's own plans failing' the imposing ot one's will upoil lilin-i by. ( virtue of the successful execution, of ;pne'ai own plans, the Allies have been pretty con- siatently failures. Russia in 1915, Serbia in 1915, Rumania in 1916, and Italy in 1917 are all cases in point where the enemy has carried through without interruption that mattered strategic schemes for which in one case complete and the others very great if not quite, decisive success is to be claimed. Upon the Allied side, the Gallipoli. Saloni- ka, Balkan, Rumanian and Italian cam- paigns justify to the hilt Hr. Lloyd George's affirmation that the hitherto pre- vailing methods will have to be torn Up by the roots and cast aside to achieve victory. It is a fatal delusion, to dwell upon mere preponderance in strength as if that would inevitably assure vict.orv. If not rightly employed. that very preponderance will but magnify the ultimate failure.

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