Papurau Newydd Cymru

Chwiliwch 15 miliwn o erthyglau papurau newydd Cymru

Herald of Wales and Monmouthshire Recorder

Nid yw statws neu berchnogaeth hawlfraint yr adnodd hwn yn hysbys.
Cuddio Rhestr Erthyglau

13 erthygl ar y dudalen hon

- -__-_ - - - -THE INNER SIDE…

Newyddion
Dyfynnu
Rhannu

THE INNER SIDE OF WAR 10 THE NEED OF SECRECY. (The Press Bureau on Tuesday isenied the following descriptive account, which lias been communicated by up Eye- witness pre6ent with the Genar-il Head- quarterr, and which continues and sup- plements the narrative published on Decemher 9th of the movements of the British Force and the French Armies in immediate touch with it. During the 6th, 7th, 8th, alid 9th of Scomber, the operations of the Army have been of the same character ai for the past. three weeks. The tale of minor events is as follows:— On Sunday, December 6th, on our right, our howitzers obtained direct hits Dn two German gun emplacements, while other guns shelled some of chb enemy's trenches with good effect. Ttier* are grounds for believing that in thi3 portion of our front the activity of our infantry in sniping, backed up by the fire of our artillery, and the ingenuity of our sappers in devising new methods of r,allying an- poyance, have rendered the enemy some- what uneasy. the quiet of njghw bein: continually broken by spasmodic out- bursts of musketry from the German trenches, and frequent firing of star shells. These precautionary outbursts, bow- ever; are perhaps not altogetuer unjusti- fied, for the Gurkhas are unpleasant enemies on dark nights, and in many places the trenches of the Indians and (Germans are only a few yards a;, art In this quarter the bombardment; of the German trenches was carried oii-z during the day, but the effect is not known. In the centre one of our battailous took the opportunity of opening fire en a Ger- man working party, and caused consider- able loss. Evidence of spying on the part of civilians was obtained on tins day- A inaii in plain clothes was observed in the hostile trenches pointing out our posi- tions. A German aviator dropped six bombs on Hazebrouck with little effect. Since it has been so frequently stateo that our howitzers have obtaine" direct hits" on the enemy's gun empl?crlJ< ents, perhaps it would be as well to explain what this means, in terms of t nmage done to the enemy. In the most unfavourable cazie tr. us it < means that one of our shells, charged with many pounds of lyddite, and fitted with percussion fuse, has detonated on a parapet of an emplacement. Tha result would be that a number of the detach- ment might be killed or wounlcd, but that the gun would, probably not be feriouslv damaged. In the most favourable case it would tican that the shell has detonated in the emplacement itself, or actually on the pun or its mounting. This would almost certainly imply the destruction cf both gun and detachment. On Monday, December 7th, there was very heavy rain. The Germans li.re-i rifle prenades for the first. time against the trenches in the centre of our line. Our artillery, however, soon put a to this innovation. On the right and the left nothing oc- curred worthy of special notice. On Tuesday, two German held < gnns were put out of action by our artillery. Our guns also set tire to tin; railway station and some rolling stock, and des- troyed a chimney used by the enemy for observation. Otherwise, notlrng occurred It rained during part of tlie uay on Wednesday. December ?th. The only item to record is that opposite tI e left of our line the enemy was hpar(: tc he cheering. This may have been cue to the receipt of a German official version of the battle of Lodz. Over the low-lying ground it was very foggy in the evening. The weather has been very wet, and much warmer curing the last four days. There has PIso been « high wind during moet of this period, irtrt our aviators have miccee 'oil in piaking several valuable recomiaissances. In spite of the absence of serious active operations, considerable progress has heen made in generally improving our situation. The number of communication tienches has been inrrnatied. the drainage and heat- ing of fire and living trenches have been arranged. The organisation of snpjly and transport services has been broaght to a higher pitch of efficiency, and everything is being prepared to meet the winter cam- paign before U6. As an instance, of wrnie of the refine- ments of active service to which we are being introduced, it may be m^n'oned that men in certain front line trenches Jtavp been regaling themselves by listen- ing on the telephone to a gramophone concert pigh-t miles away. That knowledge is power and that to be forewarned is to be fore- armed, are matters of prover- bipl philosophy, and in no spiere of human activity do they apply with greater force than in conduct of war. In the military sense, knowledge implies almost entirely accurate acquaintance jHth facts poncerning the enemy—where he iz, what the strength he is in, what he is d< ing— tn a word all that confers ability gauge hostile general's strength and weakness and to divine his intentions and his power to carry them into effect. To a greater or less degree it forms the basi8 of all action taken. Indeed, Wellington is reported to have said that he owed his success to the fact that be, was always wondering what the other fellow was doing on ':i,e other Bide of the hill. Nearly all knowledge of this nature required by a commander in the field can be included in the term in- telligence, and to its collection and analy- silg is devoted a special branch of the general staff of an army. There are various ways of acquiring in- telligence which are universally practised. They are broadly reconnaissance, whether it. be. -by cavalry, infantry, or both, by motor cycle or aircraft, employment of tpies (or as 'th..y are more pleasantly palled, agents), and the collection of such information as can bo gained from an in- spection of uniforms worn by dead or prisoners, and from papers carried by, or trosf-esamination of, the latter. In these methods there is a certain amount of over- lapping, but this does not mtail such waste of time and energy as might ap- pear, for it is only by some overup that can he obtained that corroberation of iso- lated pieces of information which enables decisions to be' made and action to be taken with some reasonable chance of suc- cess. All methods, however, wbether posi- tively or negatively, by direct or devious ways, by observation and record of major nr minor facte, work towards the sum of knowledge. The employment of agents is *n occasion the most wholesale way in rhicb intelligence can be gained, and at jiF best it furnishes a broader basis upon rhioh to build than others. The worth ef such persons does not always depend on accuracy of vision of an individual which is very variable quality, but is often es- tablished on statements of facte produced with the greatest care by the enemy for his own use. On the oth er hand, it is abso- lutely 'dependent on bona fides of a ls which is universally looked upon irith distrust, and on the ability of an individual to discriminate between what Is true and what may be fiction purposely arranged for his benefit. It is a slow .method, the transmission of the news pained being of necessity mostly effected through devious channels. It is also un- reliable as to quantity and frequency of Information furnished, for though th" col- lation of the latter is not much ailectod hy weather it depends on factors which are not under the control of the agent or his employers. Beoonnaissance is the Jtoosfc afl £ jjrobabiy the onfcbask way of obtaining news of the enernt. It is not uniform, however, in amount or quality, because it generally depends on quickness of eye and power of appreciation of some scout or observer watching from a distance, and it is liable to be interrupted or affected by the atmospheric conditions. Lastly comes the third method men- tioned. If a prisoner gives away informa- tion eifher through stupidity or from desire to curry favour, and to better his conditions, a good deal may he attained at one bound, but this applies chiefly to in-J formation given by officers who are not very often captured, and are moreover not in the habit of imparting valuable news. A soldier's knowledge of what is going on on his own side is comparatively limited. Communications from prisoners ,t-.o are to be accepted with reserve. In the direction of identification the activity of an intelligence section is largely con- fided to the examination of badges or equipment* worn by dead and by prisoners. The personality of an individual, of course, has no military value, but iden- tity discs and effects of dead are care- fully guarded for eventual return, to their Government. The examination of letters, diaries and orders also claims a great deal of attention. Newspapers are rarely of value, because no sane Government allows current details of the nature sought, to be published by the Press. On the other hand, soldiers* diaries and letters arc often indiscreet in the extreme for writers in describing the physical condition of men often unwittingly betray the state of their morale, and in recording their impressions of the effect produced by the enemy's rifle fire or havoc wrought by his artillery quite innocently give away valuable in- formation as to where the shoe pinches. Since the composition of the larger formations of all the armies is known, it JS possible, except in those cases where sweeping changes are made during a war, .0 extract vital information from the con- nection of even a single soldier killed or captured at a certain spot with a certain battalion. The result of ascertaining that this bat- talion was at that point at a given time may lead to the first suspicion that a much larger formation to which that battalion aelongs is not somewhere else where its presence has been assumed. The possible significance of the results of such a dis- covery when corroborated is obvious. This explains why the identification of units with localities by means of accoutrements, badges, etc., takes so much of the time of certain bureaus in all armies. As it has been flippantly, but by no means inaccurately, expressed, an import- ant part of the duty of a great general staff is that of constituting army corps out of a shoulder strap. During war, the air is full of rumours even at general headquarters, and when these rumours are concerned with the dispositions of the enemy their scope is much enlarged if the hostile army is composed of forces of different nationalities. On the other hand. it is not only the connection of units with localities that is useful. It often happens that the mere presence of a unit being in the field betrays the fact that reinforcements have come up, or that new formations are being raised, for, inaccurate as knowledge of the enemy may be. it is generally suffi- cientjSor the original organisation of his army to be known. As is seen.. a considerable part of the intelligence work is synthetic in char- acter, and amounts to the building up first of a possible, and then of a probable, theory, based on a mass of suspicious t facts which merely amount to sidelights and established evidence. It resembles that of the work of a detective. or the framer of a jig-saw puzzle. No small or seemingly irrelevant fact can be neglected. It is often an apparently use- less scrap of information that fits in and forms the final link in a chain of evi- dence. It is obvious, apart from. the discussion as to the causes and results, however, that if all this trouble is actually taken to identify individuals, whether in connec- tion with places or not, it must be con- sidered worth doing, and it follows that it must be, worth while to put every obstacle in the way of the enemy doing the same. That this view is held is proved by the pains at which all combatants in the present war are to prevent reference in the Press to units in tho field. This reticence is not maintained in order to deny to the general public news which would quite naturally and rightly be of absorbing interest, but in ordjr not to give gratis to the enemy information he needs, and to acquire which, if it it not presented to him, lie is forced to spend much money and trouble. A further and natural step beyond this negative policy of withholding from the enemy knowledge of where the troops are is the more active course of inducing him to suppose that they are in a locality re- mote from their actual situation. This, of course, appertains to the art of mystify- ing, misleading, and surprising the enemy which is so valuable a part of tbo conduct of war. nd re- ference may be made to what possibly was an example of its existence on a grand scale in the recent war--that. is, that between Russia and Japan. Before and during the commencement: of the battle of Mukden the great uc- known fador to the Russians WM the direction in which Marshal Oyama would throw into the fight the weight of General Nogi's third army, then on its way up from Port Arthur. Its action was found to have a great influence on the battle. It is true the creation of the new- Japanese 5th army away on the east was also somewhat of a mystery to the Russians, but its existence had been dis- covered, and it had been located ap- proximately. As is known, the Japanese commander intended to employ the bulk of the 3rd army in a sudden blow in great strength j on the west, against the Russian right. To assist in this scheme he detached a portion of the 3rd army to act with ?tlip Mb on his right which com- bined force was to open the action by an attack in the East calculated to, cause the Russians to transfer their strength to that quarter, and so away from the quarter where the Japanese main stroke was to fall. The ruse suc- ceeded, and it is believed that its success waff largely due to the fact that a frac- tion of General Nqgi's troops on the East purposely adveftisid their presence with the 5th army. Similarly reports of an intended in- vasion of England may be spread by the enemy in the hope of causing dislocation of plans, of which full advantage can btt taken- Such a course would only be in accordance with the action of the Ger- mans in 1870, when they spread abroad the rumour that there were large concen- trations of their troops in the Black Forest, where there were practically none, in order to induce the French to detain forces in Southern Alsace. Misleading reports of this nature are usually set in circulation by those in- terested, and spread either by their dupes; honest peopl« who are pur- posely allowed to overbear carefully arranged conversations held for their benefit; by means of espions, doubles. or agents, in the pay of both sides; by common traitors willing to sell their own nation: or by men working patriotically for their own country, who have an inti. mate acquaintance with the enemy nation. As an example of this may be mentioned the presence at the capital of a neutral country of a German ofncer who was for soma years stationed in London, and has! intimate knowledge of our naval, military, political, and social life, and has probably made such a deep study of our national pyschology that he would be well equipped to pla? 04 "W. idi?- !l.tUg:ui& 

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